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Review of "Stray Voltage: War in the Information Age" 
Abstract 
Stray Voltage is a timely book for a nation engaging in a global war on terrorism. Unlike most of the 
monographs reviewed in this journal, it does not explore the past, but rather offers a vision for the future. 
Written by retired brigadier general Wayne Michael Hall, the central premise of Stray Voltage is that the 
United States has entered into a “Hundred Years’ War” against cunning, ruthless adversaries who hate 
America and the American way of life. Because these enemies have no chance of competing with 
conventional U.S. military forces, Hall concludes that they will have no choice but to employ asymmetric 
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Stray Voltage is a timely book for a nation engaging in a global war on terrorism. 
Unlike most of the monographs reviewed in this journal, it does not explore the past, but 
rather offers a vision for the future. Written by retired brigadier general Wayne Michael 
Hall, the central premise of Stray Voltage is that the United States has entered into a 
“Hundred Years’ War” against cunning, ruthless adversaries who hate America and the 
American way of life. Because these enemies have no chance of competing with 
conventional U.S. military forces, Hall concludes that they will have no choice but to 
employ asymmetric strategies, tactics, and tools to achieve their ends. Foremost of these 
will be “knowledge war” and “information operations.” 
  
Hall posits that knowledge war – which he defines as “a struggle between 
adversaries over accessing and using valuable information and knowledge to gain 
advantages in decision making” (p. 14) – will serve as the underlying foundation of all 
future conflict, and that information operations – which he identifies as “activities in 
physical settings and in cyberspace purposefully designed to influence or directly affect 
the decisions of an adversary and the processes that support it” (p. 98) – will become the 
primary method of combat employed by America’s enemies in the twenty-first century. 
According to Hall, today’s U.S. military is ill-prepared to engage in knowledge war 
against an asymmetric foe skilled in information operations. 
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Hall sees several root causes underlying the American defense establishment’s 
inability to fight a successful knowledge war. Chief among these is the failure of military 
leaders to recognize that two new domains of conflict – cyberspace and the cerebral 
world – soon will eclipse in significance the traditional domains of air, land, sea, and 
space. When this happens, “knowledge workers” will become more important than the 
tanks, ships, and aircraft traditionally associated with industrial-age war. According to 
Hall, neither the civilian nor the military educational system in the United States 
currently is structured to produce the knowledge workers or “cyberwarriors” needed for 
information-age warfare. As such, he encourages educational reforms that will teach 
people how to analyze and synthesize information more efficiently. Finally, Hall 
lambastes the U.S. government’s propensity for hoarding information, a tendency that 
precludes the collaborative efforts required to solve the complex problems of national 
defense in the twenty-first century. 
  
Like any good officer, Hall not only identifies what he sees as a series of 
problems, he also provides suggestions on how to fix them. Specifically, he outlines four 
interrelated reforms for improving the United States’ capacity to cope with knowledge 
war assaults from determined adversaries. First, Hall advocates the creation of national, 
regional, state, and local Knowledge Advantage Centers (KACs), which he describes as 
locations where “people and machines collaborate to integrate data, information, and 
knowledge” (p. 160). In these KACs, knowledge workers will convert information into 
knowledge, thereby enabling leaders to make quicker and more effective decisions. 
Second, Hall argues for immediate development of a joint asymmetric opposing force “to 
help friendly security forces prepare for combating a multitude of terrorist attacks against 
key people, physical landmarks, and symbols, and, of course, to conduct operations in 
cyberspace” (p. 169). For maximum effectiveness, this asymmetric opposing force must 
use the tools of the modern knowledge warrior, employ foreign languages in all its 
operations, and strive ardently to avoid the trap of mirror-imaging. Third, Hall 
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recommends establishing a “Joint Information Operations Proving Ground” where U.S. 
forces can test and evaluate the effects of digital conflict on people, organizations, and 
materiel. Lastly, Hall proposes the creation of an internet replicator to simulate 
cyberspace and the internet. Scientists and engineers would use this simulator to develop 
“cyberbots” – sophisticated software programs that learn with experience and perform 
complex tasks such as surveillance, intelligence collection, deception, communications, 
and computer network attacks. 
  
At first glance, all of these recommendations appear reasonable, perhaps even 
prudent.  Yet Stray Voltage fails to address adequately several significant issues. To 
begin, from where is the money for these reforms going to come? Hall suggests that 
resources will have to be diverted from the traditional kinetic weapons of force-on-force 
conflict, but provides no further guidance. Exactly which industrial-age systems should 
the United States eliminate to pay for a Joint Information Operations Proving Ground or 
an internet simulator? The book also says nothing about the complex legal and 
Constitutional issues that would surround the creation of Knowledge Advantage Centers. 
Would these centers be allowed to track the physical movements, spending patterns, and 
religious affiliations of U.S. citizens? If so, would this constitute an appropriate mission 
for the American military?  Finally, all of these reforms are premised on the ability of 
knowledge workers to freely and openly exchange information. Yet even as Hall 
recommends fusing “all classifications of information” (p. 166), he acknowledges that 
“much of the nation’s infrastructure lies in the control of people loath to share relevant 
information, thereby rendering the notion of a holistic, sharing, knowledge-oriented 
networked defense system moot” (p. 183). Hall may well be right – many now believe 
the tragedies of 11 September 2001 could have been prevented if government agencies 
had been more willing to share critical information – but he offers no suggestions on how 
to eliminate the stovepipes in which so much national security information now resides. 
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For the reader interested in a lucid explanation of the buzzwords often uttered by 
defense intellectuals – knowledge war, asymmetric warfare, information superiority, 
information operations, knowledge management – this book has much to offer. Indeed, 
this reviewer would not be surprised to see one or more of America’s war colleges adopt 
Stray Voltage as a standard text. On the other hand, Hall’s reluctance to address many of 
the complex issues surrounding his recommendations makes the reforms he suggests 
seem like so much pie in the sky. After all, a viable national security strategy for the 
twenty-first century requires not only good ideas, but a game plan as well. 
 
 
